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MORE ON THE DEATH OF CONTRACT:
Gary L. Milhollin*
I. PROFESSOR GILMORE AND THE GRAVEYARD THEORISTS
There is today in the law school subject of contracts a growing stream of
thought which I will call the "graveyard theory." In a recently published
series of lectures entitled The Death of Contract, Professor Gilmore begins:
"We are told that Contract, like God, is dead. And so it is. Indeed the
point is hardly worth arguing anymore."'
Gilmore's conclusion is based upon an argument which can be summarized
as follows: Contract was "launched" by Langdell in 1871, given its
broad philosophical base soon afterward by Holmes, elaborated into specific
doctrine by Williston, and carried forward into modern times by the first Re-
statement. In its origin, the subject of contract marked a sharp break with
the past; it was not produced by a continuous development in case law. The
doctrine as it finally emerged from Williston was narrow, abstract and limited
to the "bargain theory" of consideration. Even while Williston was creating
his elaborate structure, however, courts were not following his formulations.
Cardozo and the New York Court of Appeals decided cases which did not
fit. Corbin, who confronted Williston and the other "Restaters" with an ava-
lanche of opinions in which the plaintiff recovered without showing a bargain,
forced them to include section 90.2 This produced a schizophrenic effect,
because section 90 could not be reconciled with the Holmesian requirement
of a bargain contained in section 75.8 As the law continued to develop, sec-
* Associate Professor of Law, Catholic University of America. B.S., Purdue Uni-
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2. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1932):
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or
forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee
and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be
avoided only by enforcement of the promise.
3. Id. § 75:
(1) Consideration for a promise is
(a) an act other than a promise, or
(b) a forebearance, or
(c) the creation, modification or destruction of a legal relation, or
(d) a return promise
bargained for and given in exchange for the promise.
Catholic University Law Review
tion 90 swallowed up section 75. If we add together restitution, quasi-con-
tract, promissory estoppel and the expanded consequential damages allowed
by recent glosses4 on Hadley v. Baxendale,5 we conclude that contract, hav-
ing sprung up suddenly out of tort's trespass on the case, is now sinking back
down into tort and becoming indistinguishable from it.
This is a summary of the basic argument. It concludes in effect that
contract went out with laissez-faire. The curious thing about the study is
not its novelty, though considerable novelty is there. The curious thing is
that the study does not, and could not ever because of its brevity, show
whether contract is "dead," alive and well, or even flying headlong into places
where nineteenth century scholars never dreamed it could go. The study an-
alyzes only a few cases; it mainly treats the more familiar ones in the law
of consideration. It argues, for example, that as promissory estoppel moves
into commercial relations erosion appears in the "bargain theory," and the
chance that promissory estoppel could become a theory of liability separate
from contract throws a bridge, perhaps, between contract and tort. The same
tendency toward merger is remarked in The Heron 11,6 which pushes the meas-
ure of damages awarded in contract cases closer to -the measure awarded
in tort. The study does not, and indeed cannot show, however, through its
brief survey of changes in doctrine, that contract is "dead." It can only show
that it is moving in the areas considered. Why the title, why the assumption,
and why then such an effort? The answer is that ,the "death" of contract has
been discovered in several empirical studies which Professor Gilmore appar-
ently accepts as valid and upon which he seems to rely to provide the back-
ground for his own conclusions about developments in doctrine. This essay
will comment upon whether those studies are reliable starting points in a dis-
cussion of contract doctrine and also upon Professor Gilmore's specific conclu-
sions.
In 1956, James Willard Hurst set out the broad structure of his views on
the function of contract law in nineteenth century America. 7 According to
Hurst, the dominant public policy during that period was to facilitate and en-
courage "the release of individual creative energy." 8 More specifically, con-
4. See, e.g., The Heron II, Kaufos v. C. Czarnikow, Ltd., [1967] 3 All E.R. 686
(H.L.).
5. 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
6. Kaufos v. C. Czarnikow, Ltd., [1967] 3 All E.R. 686 (H.L.).
7. J. HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM (1956).
8. Impatient confidence in productivity, and hence in any positive or restric-
tive uses of law which would free more units of production, was natural to our
situation .... We continually experienced the tangible accomplishments of
individuals, small groups, and local effort, with a heady sense of living in a
[Vol. 24:29
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tract law in the nineteenth century reflected the dominance of the free mar-
ket as the principal means for allocating labor and natural resources. As the
market developed, the need to rely upon another's performance became im-
perative. The law of contract provided the framework for this development
because it offered general freedom from restraint within the broad assump-
tion that whatever arrangement was worked out privately by the parties
would also be approved publicly by the law. 9
Less than a decade later, Hurst consolidated and buttressed these ideas
in a detailed account of the impact of contract law upon the lumber industry
in Wisconsin.'" It is in this second study that one first sees some of the con-
clusions of the "graveyard theory." Hursit analyzed seven hundred cases de-
cided from 1836 to 1915. They presented issues ranging from damages for
breach of covenant to build a sawmill to the enforcement of liquor bans in
labor agreements. He concluded:
Two general characteristics stand out boldly . . . (1) They [the
seven hundred cases] are almost all contract-law cases first, and
lumber-industry cases second. (2) They show the application of
an already well-defined and stable body of legal doctrine, with little
change over the period of the industry's lifetime."
These are important conclusions, and so are the reasons for them. The rea-
sons justify quotation:
[B]y. the second half of the nineteenth century contract was a
firm body of doctrine, of such generality that it could embrace the
problems of a new industry growing at headlong pace, without felt
fluid society in which all about him all the time one saw men moving to new
positions of accomplishment and influence. Our background and experience in
this country taught faith in the capacities of the productive talent residing in
people. The obvious precept was to see that this energy was released for its
maximum creative expression.
Id. at 7.
9. Hurst does remind us that even during headlong laissez-faire, courts refused to
enforce illegal bargains, contracts against public policy and those without consideration.
Id. at 11. Recently, it has been remarked that the nineteenth century saw the victory
of the "will" theory of contract over an earlier "equitable" view of contract held in the
eighteenth century. The view is that the older conception, which allowed juries to ex-
amine the substantive fairness of exchanges, could not survive a market for future deliv-
ery of goods which did not contemplate giving and receiving equivalents in value so
much as a fluctuating expected value determined solely by the judgment of the parties.
To protect this form of market, expectancy damages were necessary, and the law could
not inquire into the adequacy of consideration. See Horwitz, The Historical Foundations
of Modern Contract Law, 87 HARV. L. REv. 917 (1974). For similar conclusions about
the "will" theory, see Williston, Freedom of Contract, 6 CORNELL L.Q. 365 (1921).
10. J. HURST, LAW AND ECONOMIc GROWTH (1964).
11. Id. at 289.
1974]
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need to mold itself much to the peculiarities of the industry.
Taken together, these seven hundred cases show comparatively lit-
.tle significant variation in the shape of the contract law they declare
for lumber, as compared to the law that applied to other dealings
in the market. The generality in contract concepts which made
this possible was the source of both strength and weakness. It was
a source of strength, so far as it meant that the legal order could
efficiently and smoothly adapt itself to varied circumstances. But
there was weakness, so far as contract law achieved this generality
by intense devotion to a quite limited range of policies, abstracted
from the living context in which they arose. Thus there was
strength in doctrine which readily treated timberland or standing
,timber as marketable goods in a community in which they were
major assets. But there was a weakness in doctrine too abstract
to acknowledge that there might be good reasons in public policy
why trade in timberland or standing timber should not be treated as
if it were trade in grain or dry goods. The weakness was a defect in-
herent in a quality. The prime quality or function of contract law
was to serve the market's need of an assured framework of dealing;
certainty might be disturbed by intrusion of a wide range of policy
variables. The forms of contract served insistent demands of im-
mediate dealings. But they did nothing to urge men's attention to-
ward the broader or deeper context of transactions.
12
It is important to notice here the conclusion that contract is "abstract," in
the sense that it applies itself in the same way to lumber as it does to grain
or dry goods. This is a "weakness," because the lumber industry may have
particular demands not met by a wholly abstract set of rules. But it also
is a "strength," because the lumber industry had to develop from nothing into
what it became according to some legal arrangement, and no special set of
arrangements peculiar to lumber existed, obviously, before the industry de-
veloped. General contract theory was there waiting in abstraction, ready-
made, and it was used.
The "generality" or "abstractness" of contract law was also disclosed in an-
other way:
The second general characteristic of the law expressed in these
seven hundred lumber-contract cases was the comparative absence
of change in doctrine or administration, so far as contract law came
into appellate litigation.' 8
The significance of this conclusion resides in the fact that the industry in-
creased enormously in scale and complexity over the period covered by the
12. Id. at 289-90.
13. Id. at 292.
[Vol. 24:29
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study. Significant new issues of public policy were posed. How did the law
of contract respond to these newer issues?
[Ejssentially the same contract law provided 'the legal setting for
enlarged systems of dealing; indeed, the new policy problems arose
largely because the generality of contract adapted itself with so lit-
tle question to radically new directions of growth.
14
Thus, the conception is that contract law is unchanging as well as abstract.
Indeed, it is its abstraction which discourages it from being changed through
adaptation to the needs of particular applications. If one changes the doc-
trine to facilitate lumber, for example, can it still be applied as readily to
grain or dry goods? Some means must exist, of course, for subjecting an im-
portant industry to public policy. In the Wisconsin lumber industry, it was
done by legislation. Laws were passed for the recording and measurement
of logs, the creation of liens for labor and supplies, to increase damages for
timber trespass and to allow lumbermen to incorporate.'6 These enactments
did not modify basic contract doctrine. Instead, they "were in their nature
auxiliary to contract."' 6 Thus we have the finding that when real change
is needed in the legal relationships of a particular business, the change does
not come by altering the general theory of contracts; it comes by legislation
which circumvents it. It would appear that contract law, by its very nature,
was unable to effect the specific changes which were needed. It should be
pointed out, however, that in Wisconsin lumber only minor legal encroach-
ments of any kind were made upon the large domain left to private ordering;
almost all agreements were in fact carried out.' 7 Thus, the instrument of
agreement dominated, despite legislation. Finally, it appears from the study
that contract litigation was not significant at all in the real decisions which
guided the industry.
14. Id.
15. See id. at 291.
16. Id. at 293.
17. Hurst also reported that
the day-to-day flow of activity saw a vast multitude of contract dealings
which went through to consummation as the participants arranged that they
should. And in Roujet Marshall's tales of the building of the Weyerhaeuser
organization in the northwest, or Isaac Stephenson's recollections of the growth
of the industry in northeastern Wisconsin, we are reminded again that nothing
in this record is more striking than the absence of legislation or litigation chal-
lenging the basic contractual framework within which the big firms were cre-
ated. On either of these counts, we are in a measure dealing with marginal
phenomena when we focus on lawsuits in the Supreme Court. In this perspec-
tive, the Supreme Court record does not require that we make any major
change in the picture of contract as a frame of doctrine within which sweeping
power was conceded to private operators in the market to fix the allocation
of timber resources and the directions of timber industry growth.
Id. at 297.
1974]
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Hurst's empirical approach was followed in a succeeding study by Professor
Lawrence Friedman,' 8 who divided more than five hundred contract opinions
by the Wisconsin Supreme Court into three different historical periods and
then charted the changes which appeared over those periods. Period I cov-
ered the years from the organization of the Wisconsin Territory (1836) to
the Civil War; Period II ran from 1905 to 1915; and Period III from 1955
to 1958. Friedman concluded that in Period I the court experienced its
greatest period of creativity and initiative. These were the years when the
"abstract" theory of general contract law was elaborated and applied in its
purest -form. The general business framework, as well as the particularized
rules of adjustment, were furnished by the court in common law decisions. 19
]By Period II, however, pioneer times had passed; strikes, boycotts, trusts and
the "class struggle" formed the setting. "The economic struggle . . . now
centered not over position in the race to develop the economy, but over
the status quo-a struggle to exact a greater share in existing product, exist-
ing wealth."' 20 In this period the contract cases brought to court showed "the
increasing use of contract law, not for purposes of policing an abstract system,
but for solving disputes of unique particularity." The court responded with
a "retreat from abstraction," and a "growing interest in the precise and par-
ticular facts of the immediate case."'' l This was accompanied by a general
18. L. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACT LAW IN AMERICA (1965). For two interesting reviews,
see Jones, Book Review, 13 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 882 (1966); Speidel, Book Review, 1967
Wis. L. REV. 301.
19. [I]n Period I, the age of abstraction, the Wisconsin Supreme Court . . .
possessed a degree of creativity and initiative which in most senses it has not
since enjoyed . . . . [T]he notion of abstraction vested in the court the pri-
mary function of framing the rules which were to govern the essentials of busi-
ness transactions: the rules of initiation as well as adjustment . . . . [Tihe
legislature was concerned with particular derogations from abstraction-in a
sense, with adjustment.
L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 18, at 194. This "abstraction," in the sense of ignoring the
"particularities" of the specific subject matter dealt with, was in Friedman's view called
for by the times:
It was fact, not theory, that land was often bought and sold as a colorless com-
modity. It was fact, not theory, that the residents of Wisconsin were mobile
men, not rooted to a particular community or to ancient customs which fixed
persons from birth with a given social status. It was fact, not theory, that the
economy was in a state of rapid growth. Opportunities were not limited by
all the built-in and conservative values which inhere in a locality of age-old
settlement, whose cultural shape has been decisively molded by existing social
patterns.
Id. at 186.
20. Id. at 189.
21. Id. at 190. "The heavy use of such malleable concepts as waiver and estoppel
shows how the court, faced with inherited rules, but with facts which looked the other
way, was inclined to use these formulae of escape from the rigors of abstraction." Id.
[Vol. 24:29
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decline in the court as a source of important public policy. For the most
part, the court served "to work out details and iron out inconsistencies arising
under expressions of policy originating elsewhere." '22
By the time of Period III, the change from "abstraction" to "particularity"
had become even greater. "[J]udges showed more and more willingness to
examine common law doctrines in the light of 'justice' or 'common sense' or
'public policy.' Precedent and legal reasoning were not always enough." 23
This abandonment of abstract doctrine-the very framework of activity a
century earlier-was possible because of the type of case the court was asked
to hear. The court was "increasingly left with a group of very personal cases,
...problems which arose out of and because of the marginality of the liti-
gants."'24 The cases treated, for example, the problems of franchised dealers
and commission salesmen-those whose business relationships were vague
and needed definition, or were wholly new. As soon as practices in a trade
became regularized, contract law was left behind. "Two generations was
longer than most contract type-problems survived. '25 The court could afford
to become "particular," and abandon general contract doctrine, precisely be-
cause that doctrine was no longer responsible for guiding important business
decisions. The general legal framework of economic activity in Period III
was prescribed by legislation, which laid down the broad rules of business
fairness and created administrative agencies to implement and elaborate
those rules. What did this mean for contract doctrine?
In part, the activism of government in Period III was a judgment
that the market was a failure; in another sense, it was a judgment
that the economy consisted not of a market, but of many markets,
each with its appropriate modality of control. In such a context,
the law of contract remained alive, not, however, as the organic
law of the state's economic system-a kind of constitution for busi-
ness transaction-but as one among many. It was the system of
rules applicable to marginal, novel, as yet unregulated, residual,
and peripheral business, and quasi-business transactions ....
"Contract" stepped in where no other body of law and no agency
of law other than the court was appropriate or available. 26
22. Id. at 197.
23. Id. at 191. Friedman notes that many of the technical doctrines of contract law,
such as the Statute of Frauds, consideration and the rules of offer and acceptance are
usually afterthoughts when used as defenses to an action. If the court is prepared to
look into "motivation" in order to achieve "particularized" justice, the technical doctrines
must give way.
24. Id. at 201.
25. Id. at 202.
26. Id. at 193.
1974]
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In sum, we have the general finding that contract law was coextensive
with the free market, and shared its decline from a golden age in the nine-
teenth century to the "residual character" it shows today. The general
market no longer exists; we have instead an aggregation of separate markets
each regulated by non-contract law as soon as its development reaches an
important size. Only the marginal areas, the bits and scraps of activity not
coming within a larger market area, are left for classical contracts. 27  The
implications are grim for the current law school course.
By now, it should be clear that Friedman's study-an important extension
of the method and general ideas of Hurst-provides part of the coffin in
which the general theory of contracts is thought 'to be interred. Before ap-
praising Friedman's ideas or methods, it would be best to continue the tour
of the literature by turning to yet another empirical study, dealing this time
with more recent business behavior. The tomb of classical contracts was not
sealed by Professor Friedman alone.
In 1963, Professor Stewart Macaulay presented the results of interviews
with sixty-eight businessmen and lawyers representing forty-three companies
and six law firms, together with a study of business forms from 850 firms-
all in an effort to measure the extent to which contract law affects modern
business decisions. 28
First, Macaulay found that in a great number of cases exchange relation-
ships are not created with contract law in mind. Detailed planning is often
done for special, important transactions, 29 but more routine transactions are
only planned to -the extent that "boilerplate" forms set out the conditions
27. Friedman's conclusions, which are similar to Hurst's, can be summarized as fol-
lows: contract is abstiact: "it does not matter whether the subject of the contract
is a goat, a horse, a carload of lumber, a stock certificate, or a shoe. As soon as it
matters-e.g., if the sale is of heroin, or of votes for governor, or of an 'E' Bond, or
labor for twenty-five cents an hour-we are in one sense no longer talking pure con-
tract." Id. at 20. When it is necessary for the law to change in response to changes
in business conditions, the changes "do not look in form like changes in the law of con-
tract; they look like labor law, insurance law, social security or public utility regulation.
Id. at 23. Contract is static: "By definition, no revolution could take place because
contract law acted as a residual category, its content determined mainly by what law
did in other respects affecting economic behavior. Instead, types of transactions
marched in and out of the area of contract." Id. Finally: "The most dramatic changes
touching the significance of contract law in modern life . .. came about . . . through
developments in public policy which systematically robbed contract of its subject-mat-
ter." Id. at 24.
28. Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28
AM. SOCIOLOGICAL REv. 55 (1963).
29. The sale of the Empire State Building is cited as an example. "More than 100
attorneys representing 34 parties, produced a 400 page contract." Id. at 57.
[Vol. 24:29
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under which they are made. 0 Of seven lawyers with business practices, five
"thought that businessmen often entered contracts with only a minimal de-
gree of advance planning;" preferring instead to rely on ",a man's word," a
"handshake," or "common honesty and decency."'' a The findings are par-
ticularly interesting with regard to the "battle of the forms." Almost all of
the purchasing agents interviewed said they assumed a deal was binding even
,though, as frequently happened, the conditions on the back of the seller's
form were inconsistent with those on the back of the buyer's form.32 Nine
of sixteen sales managers said that "frequently no agreement was reached
on which set of fine print was to govern."33 In one instance, a manufacturer
audited its records over a five-day period in four different years to see how
often the "battle of the forms" had produced a contract in response to orders
from its customers. In roughly seventy percent of the cases, no contract was
technically formed.3 4 Finally, even though requirements contracts are prob-
ably not enforceable in Wisconsin, interviews showed that Wisconsin firms
regularly used them with knowledge of house counsel.3 5
Macaulay's second finding was that contract law is even less significant in
the adjustment of business exchanges than in their creation.36
[A]II ten of the purchasing agents asked about cancellation of orders
once placed indicated that they expected to be able to cancel orders
freely subject to only an obligation to pay for the seller's major ex-
penses such as scrapped steel. All 17 sales personnel asked re-
ported that they often had to accept cancellation. 7
When a dispute did arise, it was usually settled without reference to whatever
contract existed between the parties.
If something comes up, you get the other man on the telephone
and deal with the problem. You don't read legalistic contract
clauses at each other if you ever want to do business again. One
doesn't run to lawyers if he wants to stay in business because one
must behave decently.
38
30. Of 1,200 companies replying to requests for forms, 850 companies "used some
type of standardized planning." Only the very small businesses did not attempt to
standardize. Id. at 58.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 59. Among the more famous cases dealing with this issue is Roto-Lith,
Ltd. v. F.P. Bartlett & Co., 297 F.2d 497 (lst Cir. 1962).
33. Macaulay, supra note 28, at 59.
34. See id. at 60.
35. See id.
36. See id. at 61.
37. Id.
38. Id. Macaulay reports that "[olnly five of the 12 purchasing agents had ever been
involved in even a negotiation concerning a contract dispute where both sides were rep-
resented by lawyers; only two of ten sales managers had ever gone this far." Id.
1974]
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This relatively minor reliance on contract law is explained in several ways.
First, a general set of behavioral norms is said to be accepted in most busi
ness dealings: "(1) Commitments are to be honored in almost all situations;
one does not welsh on a deal. (2) One ought to produce a good product
and stand behind it." 9 Other considerations which bear on the manner in
which businessmen deal with each other may include the desire to continue
a fruitful relationship which goes beyond the scope of the particular matter
at hand; a concern for one's reputation in the trade; the continuing personal
relations between salesmen and purchasing agents, as well as between engi-
neering staffs which render mutual assistance; or even the fostering of purely
social contacts between top executives. In ithis "friendly" atmosphere, con-
tract law can even be a liability. To insist on having every remote contin-
gency covered in advance "indicates a lack of trust and blunts the demands
of friendship, turning a cooperative venture into an antagonistic horse
trade. '40  Contract litigation is also found to have specific drawbacks. Not
only may it end the business relationship, but it also demands unrecoverable
outlays which cannot be justified in view of the possible judgment. 41 Thus,
litigation is principally limited to -the "one shot deal," the unforeseen disaster,
or the conract growing out of speculation. 42 In the ongoing type of business
arrangement, it is the non-legal sanction that causes an agreement to be car-
ried out. In sum, Macaulay finds that contract law-in the sense of the
classical rules for dealing laid down in its technical doctrines-is of little rele-
vance either to the decision to form a business agreement, or to the adjust-
ments needed to carry it out.
With the review of these -three studies, one has toured the foundation of
the "graveyard theory" of contracts. 43  The studies argue that the present
law school course is obsolete-basically because it still limits itself to the
problems set forth by Langdell in 1871. Because contract doctrine is abstract
and incapable of change, it has not and cannot respond to any need for re-
form. Carried forward by Williston and the Restatement, these old problems
39. Id. at 63.
40. Id. at 64.
41. To mount a trial, especially in another city, is expensive. "Top management does
not travel by Greyhound and stay at the Y.M.C.A." Id.
42. An example given is the wrongful termination of a dealer's franchise by a manu-
facturer. The relation has ended, and no other sanction is likely to work. Id. at 65.
43. Other studies have also been made. See Macaulay, Changing a Continuing Rela-
tionship Between a Large Corporation and Those Who Deal With It: Automobile Man-
ufacturers, Their Dealers and the Legal System-Part 11, 1965 Wis. L. REv. 740; Com-
ment, The Statute of Frauds and the Business Community: A Reappraisal in Light of
Prevailing Practices, 66 YALE L.J. 1038 (1957). And of course there is the celebrated
article by Llewellyn, What Price Contract?-An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE L.J. 704
(1931).
[Vol. 24:29
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are no longer thought to reflect the significant issues facing modern business. 44
As soon as a problem gets big enough to require recurring treatment, it is
moved out of contract into some new area of the law. 45 Even in the small
domain which is left to contract, however, it is the non-legal sanction which
really serves to encourage performance. 46  In view of the kinds of cases left
for contract law to solve, one must ask whether the effort spent in law school
to refine contract doctrine can still be justified. To continue with the present
material "could be compared to a zoology course which confined its study
to dodos and unicorns, to beasts rare or long dead and beasts that never
lived." 4
7
II. THE DECLINE OF CONTRACT
It is against the background of these empirical studies that one must view
Professor Gilmore's book. The main argument of the book is that contract,
abruptly and perhaps adventitiously created as a separate subject, is merging
back into tort whence it came.
48
A. The Classical Theory
In a brief chapter entitled "Origins," the book begins with the familiar ob-
servation about Langdell-that he launched "the idea that there was-or
should be-such a thing as a general theory of contract."' 49  Gilmore makes
the point, however, that it was really Holmes who laid the broad philosophical
foundations for the classical theory. 50 It was Holmes who formulated the
44. See Friedman & Macaulay, Contract Law and Contract Teaching: Past, Present
and Future, 1967 Wis. L. REV. 805, 819.
45. See id. at 812. "Contracts casebooks ...lovingly preserve many construction-
contract cases that, whatever 'fundamental' issues they may raise, are obsolete as con-
struction contract cases because the construction business is no longer conducted that
way." Id. at 813.
46. See id. at 814.
47. L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 18, at 25.
48. See GILMORE 87.
49. Id. at 13.
50. Id. at 14. See Howe, Introduction to O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW at xiv-
xv (1963):
Many of Holmes's contemporaries, both in England and in the United States,
were as aware as he was of the great importance of discovering the truly basic
concepts in the common law---concepts with a deeper philosophic significance
than those which had sufficed to preserve a clumsy sort of order while the
forms of action ruled the common law. Those forms, if not yet abolished ev-
erywhere, were slipping unregretted into the graves which Benthamite reform-
ers had dug for them. While they governed the practice and the minds of law-
yers it had not been necessary to conceive a theory of contract, a theory of
tort, or a theory of possession. Assumpsit, covenant, and debt; trespass, case,
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bargain theory of consideration, who was not prepared to reimburse the
reliance later protected by section 90 of the Restatement and who affirmed
that people had a right, by paying damages, to ",break their contracts. ' 51 Gil-
more quotes Holmes as follows:
It is said that consideration must not be confounded with motive.
It is true that it must not be confounded with what may be the
prevailing or chief motive in actual fact. A man may promise to
paint a picture for five hundred dollars, while his chief motive may
be a desire for fame. A consideration may be given and accepted,
in fact, solely for ,the purpose of making a promise binding. But,
-nevertheless, it is the essence of a consideration, that, by the terms
of the agreement, it is given and accepted as the motive or induce-
ment for furnishing the consideration. The root of the whole mat-
ter is the relation of reciprocal conventional inducement, each for
the other, between consideration and promise.52
Gilmore then remarks:
Now the vulgar error that any benefit or any detriment would
do has been exploded. It is clear that there are benefits and bene-
fits, detriments and detriments. No matter how much detriment
a promisee may have suffered, he has not, thereby, necessarily fur-
nished a consideration. Nor does he have, so far as Holmes takes
us, any right to redress or even any claim on our sympathies, no
matter how reasonable his detrimental reliance may have been, not
even if, in the course of incurring his detriment, he has conferred
a benefit on the other party. Absent "consideration," the unhappy
promisee has no right or claim. And nothing is "consideration" un-
less "the parties have dealt with it on -that footing." There must
be, in the final mysterious phrase, "the relation of reciprocal con-
ventional inducement, each for the other, between consideration
and promise." That indeed is "the root of the whole matter."5
These general principles established by Holmes were, according to Gil-
more, transformed by Williston into the familiar rules of contract doctrine.
This was done only after some bending and bruising of decisional precedents.
and trover; ejectment, detinue, and replevin-these forms of action had been
forms of analysis and substitutes, accordingly, for generalizing thought. The
task of Holmes's generation and the generation which preceded his, was that
of discovering a philosophically satisfactory and practically useful scheme or
order for the common law.
See also Laski, The Political Philosophy of Mr. Justice Holmes, 40 YALE L.J. 683
(1931).
51. O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw 230 (1963).




The old favorite of Dickinson v. Dodds54 is given as one example. That case
held that an offer had been effectively revoked because the offeree, be-
fore acceptance, learned from a third party that the offeror had already sold
(or was intending to sell) the property to another. Although the offer was
to be left open until 9 a.m. on Friday, and the offeree tried to accept it at 7
a.m. on Friday, the court said there was no meeting of the minds because the
offeree had learned on Thursday of the offeror's change in plans. In the
opinion, no one suggested that the doctrine of consideration was relevant, so
Williston is criticized for citing Dickinson as 'the leading case for the prop-
osition that "offers unless under seal or given for consideration may be re-
voked at any time prior to the creation of a contract by acceptance. '5 5 The
familiar duo of Harris v. Watson56 and Stilk v. Myrick57 serve as another ex-
ample. In Harris, a shipmaster during a voyage promised his seamen that
he would pay a five guinea bonus if they would perform some extra work
to save the endangered ship. In Stilk, the shipmaster agreed to divide among
the crew the wages of two seamen who deserted at Cronstadt (it being impos-
sible to replace them) if the crew would work the ship back to London short-
handed. The court denied recovery in ,both cases, saying in Harris that the
"rule was founded on public policy,"58 and in Stilk that the "agreement was
void for want of consideration." Here, Williston is criticized for lumping the
cases together as authority for a "rule" that a modification in the duty of
a party to a contract is not binding unless supported by "additional" consid-
eration. 59 Finally, we have Foakes v. Beer,60 the approval of which has
drawn Williston considerable criticism.
54. [1876] 2 Ch. D. 463 (C.A.).
55. GILMORE 30.
56. Peake 102, 170 Eng. Rep. 94 (K.B. 1791).
57. 2 Camp. 317, 170 Eng. Rep. 1168 (K.B. 1809).
58. "[I]f sailors were . . . in time of danger entitled to insist on an extra charge
on such a promise as this, they would in many cases suffer a ship to sink, unless the
captain would pay any extravagant demand they might think proper to make." 170 Eng.
Rep. at 94.
59. Where A and B have entered into a bilateral agreement, it not infrequently
happens that one of the parties, becoming dissatisfied with the contract, refuses
to perform or to continue performance unless a larger compensation than that
provided in the original agreement is promised him . . . . On principal the
second agreement [i.e., the Cronstadt agreement in Stilk] is invalid for the per-
formance by the recalcitrant contractor is no legal detriment to him whether
actually given or promised, since, at the time the second agreement was entered
into, he was already bound to do the work; nor is the performance under the
second agreement a legal benefit to the promisor since he was already entitled
to have the work done. In such situations and others identical in principle, the
great weight of authority supports this conclusion.
GILMORE 23, quoting I WILLI STON, CONTRACTS § 130 (lst ed. 1920).
60. 9 App. Cas. 605 (P.C. 1884). In Foakes, a creditor agreed to forgive the interest
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It is generally agreed that Foakes was a bad decision, both in result and
in method. People should be able to compromise debts. It is also true that
the seamen's cases express strong tones of public policy which are not re-
flected in Wiliston's abstract formulation of doctrine. Finally, Dickinson did
turn on assent. However, one may ask whether this is really a basis for mak-
ing Williston a villain. In an article written in 1921, where Williston dis-
cussed (and condemned) the narrow view of the nineteenth century toward
promises in restraint of trade, he said:
Observation of results has proved that unlimited freedom of con-
tract, like unlimited freedom in other directions, does not necessar-
ily lead to public or individual welfare and that the only ultimate
test of proper limitations is that provided by experience.A
The main argument for the decline and fall of contracts is presented in
the last chapter of Gilmore's book, which he begins by arguing that the bar-
gain theory of consideration was never as widely accepted as Holmes and
Williston pretended. Many cases had held that consideration existed even
though no bargain, in the technical sense, could be found. Cardozo's opin-
ions in De Cicco v. Schweizer,62 Allegheny College v. National Chautauqua
Bank65 and Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon,64 are cited to show that the
Holmesian formula was not the law in New York. However, the Holmes-
Williston formula eventually became accepted as the definition of consid-
eration, though not wholly supported by the cases. It was still necessary,
on a debt if the debtor would agree to pay it off in installments. The debtor did so,
but then the creditor sued to recover the interest. The court, relying on an earlier deci-
sion, held that the creditor's promise was not binding because the debtor had given no
consideration; the duty to pay off the debt was already owing under the parties' original
agreement, so the debtor incurred no additional detriment by paying it off and the cred-
itor received no benefit by receiving what was already due. Of course, as the lawyer
for the defendant Foakes had argued, "Mankind have never acted on the doctrine."
61. Williston, supra note 9, at 374.
62. 221 N.Y. 431, 117 N.E. 807 (1917). The court held, in an action to enforce
a father's promise of an annuity to his engaged daughter, that each party to the engage-
ment was under a duty to carry it out; and thus by doing so furnished no consideration
for the father's promise. However, consideration was found in the forebearance by both
parties, acting together, to exercise their mutual right to rescind.
63. 246 N.Y. 369, 159 N.E. 173 (1927). A gratuitous pledge to a college endow-
ment fund was enforced by implying a promise on the part of the college to "perpetuate
the name of the founder of the memorial."
64. 222 N.Y. 88, 118 N.E. 214 (1917). Lucy promised Wood the exclusive right
"to place her indorsements on the designs of others" in exchange for half the profits.
Wood was to have the right to do so for one year, but Lucy secretly placed her indorse-
ments herself and kept the profits. Lucy said Wood had given no consideration to sup-
port her promise, since he had not bound himself to anything at all. Cardozo held that
Wood's promise should be implied, the arrangements being "'instinct with an obliga-
tion,' imperfectly expressed.". Id. at 91, 118 N.E. at 214 (citation omitted).
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therefore, to explain the many decisions enforcing promises which were not
bargains. If consideration meant bargain, a different phrase was required:
thus, promissory estoppel emerged.65 The Restatement did not use the word
estoppel, but it incorporated in section 90 the distinctly nonbargain ground
of detrimental reliance as a basis for enforcing promises. According to Gil-
more, the eventual triumph of section 90 over its rival, section 75, shows the
decline of the Holmesian formulation.
Original § 90 . . . was exposed to the world naked of Comment
and provided with four ambiguous illustrations as its sole capital.
Text and illustration together took up less than a page. Revised
§ 90 with its Comment and Illustrations runs to over twelve pages
and the original four Illustrations have grown to seventeen ...
The principal change from Restatement (First) rests, however,
in the elaborate Commentary which has been provided. The re-
liance principle, we are told, may have been, historically, the basis
for ",the enforcement of informal contracts in the action of assump-
sit."
"Certainly [the Comment continues] reliance is one of the main
bases for enforcement of the half-completed exchange, and the
probability of reliance lends support to -the enforcement of the ex-
ecutory exchange. . . . This Section -thus states a basic principle
which often renders inquiry unnecessary as to the precise scope of
the policy of enforcing bargains."
Thus the unwanted stepchild of Restatement (First) has become
"a basic principle" of Restatement (Second) which, the comment
seems to suggest, prevails, in case of need, over the competing "bar-
gain theory" of § 75.66
The next symptom of decay is found in the liberalization of recovery in
various cases where benefit has been conferred on the defendant. 67  By ex-
panding the theory of unjust enrichment, and by liberalizing the rules of "sub-
stantial performance," the law is moving away from .the bargain idea on the
benefit side as well as the detriment side. Promissory estoppel, Gilmore
notes, is merely the twin of unjust enrichment: the latter applies to the case
where the plaintiff has conferred a benefit on the defendant; the former ap-
plies when the plaintiff has simply suffered a loss through reliance on the
defendant's promise.68 The old problem of the "illusory promise" has also
been put to rest, so that people can now rely upon the enforceability of re-
65. This concept, of course, was not new. See Ricketts v. Scothorn, 57 Neb. 51, 77
N.W. 365 (1898).
66. GILMORE 71-72.
67. See id. at 73.
68. Id. at 88-89.
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quirements contracts. The now exploded theory of mutuality of obligation
has followed suit. And, insofar as remedies are concerned, Gilmore observes
that even Hadley v. Baxendale69 is showing strain. The recent decision in
the Heron JJ,70 as mentioned above, makes the measure of liability for breach
of contract more similar to that for torts.
Finally, the emergence of promissory estoppel as a distinct form of liability
may point the way to a new fusion between contracts and torts.
The most recent, and quite possibly the most important, develop-
ment in the promissory estoppel or § 90 cases has been the sug-
gestion that such contract-based defenses as the Statute of Frauds
are not applicable when the estoppel (or reliance) doctrine is in-
voked as the ground for decision. This line, if it continues to be
followed, may -ultimately provide the doctrinal justification -for the
fusing of contract and tort in a unified theory of civil obligation.
. . . By passing through the magic gate of § 90, it seems, we can
rid ourselves of all the technical limitations of contract theory.
And if we choose to follow the alternative route of recovery under
theories of quasi-contract or unjust enrichment-§ 89A in Restate-
ment (Second)-the argument that the contract limitations no
longer apply seems to be quite as strong as it is in the § 90 cases.
If we manage to get that far, the absurdity of attempting to pre-
serve the nineteenth century contract-tort dichotomy will have be-
come apparent even to the law professors who write law review ar-
ticles and books .... 71
From this analysis of changing doctrine, Gilmore draws his final conclu-
sion:
Speaking descriptively, we might say that what is happening is
that "contract" is being reabsorbed into the mainstream of "tort."
Until the general theory of contract was hurriedly run up kte in
the nineteenth century, tort had always been our residual category
of civil liability. As the contract rules dissolve, it is becoming so
again ...
We have had more than one occasion to notice the insistence of
the classical theorists on the sharp differentiation between contract
and tort-the refusal to admit any liability in "contract" until the
formal requisites of offer, acceptance and consideration had been
satisfied, the dogma that only "bargained-for" detriment or benefit
could count 'as consideration, and notably, the imitations on dam-
age recovery. Classical contract theory might well be described as
an attempt to stake out an enclave within the general domain of
69. 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
70. Kaufos v. C. Czarnikow, Ltd., [1967] 3 All E.R. 686 (H.L.).
71. Gm oRE 90 (citations omitted).
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tort. The dykes which were set up to protect the enclave have,
it is clear enough, been crumbling at a progressively rapid rate.
. . . We are fast approaching the point where, to prevent unjust
enrichment, any benefit received by a defendant -must be paid for
unless it was dearly meant as a gift; where any detriment reason-
-ably incurred by a plaintiff in reliance on a defendant's assurances
must be recompensed. When that point is reached, there is really
no longer any viable distinction between liability in contract and
liability in tort. We may take the fact that damages in contract
have become indistinguishable from damages in tort as obscurely
reflecting an instinctive, ,almost unconscious realization that the two
fields, which had been artificially set apart, are gradually merging
and becoming one.
72
This, then, is Gilmore's principal thesis. It is stimulating and very well
put. The tour of familiar problems in doctrine makes fresh and telling points
against Holmes and Williston. Does it, however, demonstrate the "death"
of contract? Perhaps one should distinguish between the "death" of contract
from a theoretical point of view-from the point of view of doctrinal sepa-
rateness from "tort"-and from a practical point of view-from the point of
view of the actual use of general contract law in exchange transactions. Pro-
fessor Gilmore's analysis is directed only to the theoretical side. Has he dem-
onstrated by his discussion of developments in promissory estoppel, quasi-
contract and the measure of damages that contract and tort are being
merged? It would seem the answer is no. How does one explain in tort, for
example, the enforcement of a wholly executory contract upon which one has
spent nothing in reliance? Here, one wants to "gain" from one's "bargain,"
not be restored to the pre-contract status quo. Whenever one's expectancy is
greater than one's reliance or any benefit conferred by part performance, the
recovery must depend upon a promise. It was the modem market place
which demanded that contractual liability reach this extent.73 If contract is
to be merged into tort, is the theory of tort now to include a rationale for
such recoveries? Or is contract no longer to protect a pure expectancy?
Professor Gilmore furnishes no answers.
It is true, of course, that promissory estoppel and quasi-contract have ex-
72. Id. at 87-88 (citations omitted). The idea that contract and tort are merging has
been explored before. Morris Cohen, in discussing the various theoretical bases for con-
tract liability, observed that under the now popular injurious reliance theory, "the whole
question of contract is integrated in the larger realm of obligations, and this tends to
put our issues in the right perspective and to correct the misleading artificial distinctions
between breach of contract and other civil wrongs." Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46
HARv. L. Rav. 553, 578 (1933).
73. See Horwitz, supra note 9, at 946-52.
1974]
Catholic University Law Review
panded at the expense of the narrower view of Holmes and Williston. It
is quite valuable to have this so ably pointed out. But it is difficult to see
how the expansion of -those doctrines supports an argument that the other
side of contraot theory-the protection of the promisee's expectancy interest
in his bargain-was therefore weakened in any way or made to depend upon
some basis for recovery other than a promise.
B. Promissory Estoppel and Contract Theory
Promissory estoppel has indeed been one of the most interesting areas of
development in contract theory. Professor Gilmore does not discuss Hoffman
v. Red Owl Stores, Inc.,74 the leading case for the proposition that promissory
estoppel may provide a basis for liability separate from contract. In HoIf-
man, the promise was found to be insufficiently definite to form a contract
even if it had been accepted, yet the court held that for liability under section
90 -the promise need not be "so comprehensive as to meet the requirements
of an offer that would ripen into a contract if accepted by the promisee." 75
In effect, the court found promissory estoppel to be an independent basis for
liability.76 The cases decided since Hoffman appear to be divided on the
issue of whether section 90 liability is separate from that of contract. In Tif-
fany, Inc. v. W.M.K. Transit Mix, Inc.77 and Turtle Creek Square, Ltd. v.
New York State Teachers Retirement System78 the courts, in refusing to fol-
low Hoffman, held that in a section 90 action the defense of the Statute of
Frauds is only avoided where there 'has been a second promise to execute
a writing. Of course, if section 90 were a new ground for liability separate
from contract, the Statute of Frauds defense would be inapplicable. Like-
wise, in Boddy v. Gray,79 the court refused to enforce the promise where the
terms were not definite enough to form an "enforceable agreement." In sup-
port of the Hoffman result are H.W. Stanfield Construction Co. v. Robert
McCullan & Son, Inc.80 and Associated Tabulating Service, Inc. v. Olympic
Life Insurance Co.8s  In the former, the court deemed immaterial the de-
fendant's argument that the action must fail because of lack of mutual assent
74. 26 Wis. 2d 683, 133 N.W.2d 267 (1965).
75. Id. at 698, 133 N.W.2d at 275.
76. Id.
77. 16 Ariz. App. 415, 493 P.2d 1220 (1972). See also Bevins v. Dickson Electron-
ics Corp., 16 Ariz. App. 105, 491 P.2d 494 (1971).
78. 432 F.2d 64 (5th Cir. 1970).
79. 497 S.W.2d 600 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973). See also Ziese v. Ramada Inns, Inc.,
463 F.2d 1058 (7th Cir. 1972).
80. 14 Cal. App. 3d 848, 92 Cal. Rptr. 669 (Ct. App. 1971). The court relied upon
Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 51 Cal. 2d 409, 333 P.2d 757 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
81. 414 F.2d 1306 (5th Cir. 1969).
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since a promissory estoppel theory is not premised upon the existence of a
contract. In the latter, the court found insufficient evidence to support a
claim that a five-year contract had been formed binding the defendant to
have its data processing needs met by a computer concern. However, the
court did find that the preliminary negotiations were sufficient to establish
a claim for promissory estoppel. In short, it is by no means clear, nor even
likely, that promissory estoppel has supplanted contract theory.
It is undeniable that the promissory estoppel cases have changed the scope
of liability in 'an area where the traditional rules of Williston either did not
recognize it at all or awarded full expectancy damages by manipulating the
rules of offer and acceptance. The real importance of this advance will be
in the (non-gratui-tous) negotiation of business deals. There is a great deal
more honesty and flexibility in simply reimbursing the promisee's reliance in
a case where no full bargain was reached but where the promisor's actions
have nevertheless damaged the promisee. This additional flexibility takes
nothing away from the general idea of contract, however. The decision to
grant or withhold relief in these cases can be made only in light of -the fac-
tors which have always guided the decision of contract (as opposed to tort)
issues. For example, was there in fact a promise? Is it just to hold that
one party was bound at a point in the negotiations where the other party
was still free to withdraw? To what extent would such liability discourage
the freedom which is desirable in negotiations? Indeed, the entire question
may best be treated as one of breach of a "contract to bargain.' '82 The cases
decided since Hoffman make it clear that contract principles will continue
to dominate judicial decisions in this area.
If one wished to inquire whether contract were being absorbed by tort,
there are other areas of development more fruitful than promissory estoppel.
In product liability cases, for example, there has been a preference for the
tort action of strict liability because contract defenses (such as privity) can
be avoided. Professor Gilmore points this out.8 3 He does omit to add, how-
ever, that this tort characterization extends only to those tort principles rele-
82. See Knapp, Enforcing the Contract to Bargain, 44 N.Y.U.L. REv. 673 (1969).
Knapp has pointed out that in cases such as Hoffman the parties may have "agreed
to agree," and yet have one of three possible intentions: each party may regard himself
and the other as free to withdraw for any reason; as fully bound unless an excuse exists
which would excuse performance of an ordinary executory contract; or as not completely
bound, but nevertheless "committed to the deal" in the sense of being bound to try in
good faith to reach some agreement. For further discussion, see Henderson, Promissory
Estoppel and Traditional Contract Doctrine, 78 YALE L.J. 343 (1969); Comment, Once
More into the Breach: Promissory Estoppel and Traditional Damage Doctrine, 37 U.
Cm. L. REV. 559 (1970).
83. GiLMORE 92-94.
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vant in solving the particular problem presented. If the question is -liability
for personal injuries to consumers of bad food, then tort policies for distribut-
ing social risks should apply. However, if the question is the liability of a
manufacturer of component parts to a manufacturer of assembled products
for -the failure of a component to perform as specified, then ,the commercial
claim for money damages should be governed by contract principles of fair-
ness between the parties based upon their promises.
Perhaps the clearest example of all on the question of merger between con-
tract and tort is section 524A of the proposed Restatement of Torts. 4 This
section would make a seller liable in tort to a buyer for innocent mate-
rial misrepresentations which induce a sale. Damages would equal the
difference between what the buyer gave and what he received. There
is a -lively argument today over the question of whether this tort action- in
which the buyer would 'be allowed to keep the goods and sue for damages-
should be permitted when there are defenses which would preclude recovery
in contract for breach of warranty. What is the difference between an inno-
cent misrepresentation of material fact which induces a sale (a tort action)
and 'a breach of warranty (a contract action)? Perhaps we are dealing with
what Professor Hill calls "breach of contract as a tort." As he very ably
points out,85 the effect of the -tort characterization is to avoid the parol evi-
dence rule and possibly other contract defenses as well. In contract, for
example, the buyer may rescind for a material misrepresentation and void
the exchange, but ordinarily he must return what he has received. The al-
ternative to rescission is to enforce the exchange by keeping the goods and
suing for damages. Where the buyer rescinds, resort to parol evidence is per-
missible notwithstanding an integrated writing; where the buyer enforces, he
may not have the benefit of a bargain made orally where an integrated writ-
ing exists. Under section 524A, however, the buyer in a tort action would
be allowed to keep the goods despite an integration, show the oral misrepre-
sentation and recover as restitutionary damages the difference between what
-he received and what he gave. Obviously, if this view is adopted, tort will
84. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 524A (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1958). The
section reads as follows:
(1) One who, in a sale, rental or exchange transaction with another, makes
a misrepresentation of a material fact for the purpose of inducing the other
to act or to refrain from action in reliance upon it, is subject to liability to
the other for the harm caused by his justifiable reliance upon the misrepresenta-
tion, even though it is made without knowledge of its falsity or negligence.
(2) If such a misrepresentation is made without knowledge of its falsity
or negligence, the damages recoverable for it are limited to the difference be-
tween the value of what the other has parted with and the value of what he
has received in the transaction.
85. Hill, Breach of Contract as a Tort, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 40 (1974); Hill, Damages
for Innocent Misrepresentation, 73 COLrM. L. REV. 679 (1973).
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have supplanted contract in an area of potentially greater importance than
that covered by developments in promissory estoppel and quasi-contract.
Whenever the value of what the buyer gave is equal to the value of the goods
as represented, the buyer gets his expectancy despite traditional contract de-
fenses. Professor Hill has noted that the courts, despite being repeatedly
urged to do so, have not adopted this view. 80
The question of whether contract is alive and well is a hard one. Hurst,
Friedman and Macaulay have made a strong case that it is not. Gilmore's
short tour of doctrine obviously was inspired by their work 87 and is under-
standable only in light of it because, standing alone, Gilmore's observations
do not show that contract is "dead"--either from a doctrinal perspective or
from an empirical perspective. By assuming, however, the validity of the
conclusions reached ,by the "graveyard theorists," one might find in the ero-
sion of Williston's rules an additional side of the general point already estab-
lished. If the conclusions of the "graveyard theory" become conventional
wisdom, we might see more "studies in the decay of doctrine" following in
Gilmore's wake.
Again, is contract alive and well? Or, what is its utility in the day of rent
control, insurance, labor and ,utility regulation, retail price maintenance, food
and housing subsidies, land-use control, form warranties and freezes on
prices and wages?88  It would require an empirical study far more vast in
scope than those already done to answer that question. Until such a study
is made, an example and some tentative observations will have to suffice.
III. CONTRACT LAW As A SOCIAL ORDERING DEVICE
A. Contract and Litigation
It is best to begin by pointing out a principal weakness in the "graveyard
theory"- it equates the importance of litigation ias a means of social control
with ,the importance of contract law as a means of social control. There can
be little doubt that litigation has decreased enormously in importance during
the twentieth century. As the small, sharp trading Yankee entrepreneur
has been replaced by the conglomerate corporation, decisions in the economy
have moved from the "invisible hand" working through innumerable inde-
pendent operators, to .the more powerful and more visible hands which work
86. Hill, Breach of Contract as a Tort, 74 COLuM. L. REv. 40, 50 (1974). But see
W. PROSSPR, THE LAW OF TORTS 710-14 (4th ed. 1971).
87. "The decline and fall of the general theory of contract and, in most quarters, of
laissez-faire economics may be taken as remote reflections of the transition from nine-
teenth century individualism to the welfare state and beyond." GILMORE 95-96.
88. See F. KESSLER & G. GILMORE, CoNTrsACS, CASES ANiP MATEnAL$ 12 (2d ed.
1970).
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through centralized economic planning.89  To influence decisions in the
planned markets of today it is necessary to make laws which operate prospec-
tively. Litigation operates essentially in retrospect, to declare rights and
duties as they existed at some point anterior to the decision. The only
prospective effect of litigation is in the importance of a case for stare decisis,
or in its interpretation of a statute. In public law, where decisions are mostly
directed to officials, or in tort, where most harm is not planned, the prospec-
tive effect of litigation is considerable and courts serve as principal sources
of the law. In contracts, where the object is -to plan, it is somewhat more
difficult for courts -to generate law because in any case which 'arises the party
adversely affected by a change in doctrine can plead unfair surprise.
More important than this, however, is the complete inability of litigation to
formulate, through the slow process of stare decisis, the bodies of detailed
regulation necessary -to deal with the complex planning in industries such as
insurance, housing and securities. It is simply not feasible -to generate a se-
curities law or a housing code through stare decisis. One must lay down the
rules in advance and notify those affected by any change before putting it
into effect. If abuses exist, one cannot wait for the trial and error process
of deciding individual cases.
B. Contract and Social Ordering
If one measures the usefulness of contract law by the extent to which
modern business is con-trolled -through precedents established in contract liti-
gation, one will find that contract law is not very useful. The 'truth is, how-
ever, that litigation is becoming less important as a source of law-irrespec-
tive of the subject matter--because of the way our economy functions. This
is especially so in contract, which deals exclusively with planning. It should
come as no surprise that business ethics have recognized the need in a
planned economy for performance of agreements. This would indicate, if
anything, that the regime of private ordering is stronger than ever. In Dean
Pound's words: "Wealth, in a commercial age, is made up largely of prom-
ises."' 0  If one wishes to measure the importance of contract law, one must
look beyond litigation.
The importance of general contract law lies in its support for the regime
of social ordering through private agreement which it is still the object of
the specialized branches of law to facilitate. In insurance law, labor law,
commercial law and the law of landlord-tenant, the rules exist 'to facilitate pri-
vate ordering. Labor law, for example, encourages agreement because
89. See J. GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTIAL STATE 22-45 (1967).
90. R. POUND, INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 236 (1922),
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agreement is the only way to arrive at -a solution to many labor problems.
Legislation has intervened to set a floor on wages, require extra payment for
overtime and prohibit (among other things) acts which impede bargaining;
but legislation has not and probably will never decide the basic issue of how
much a given private employee should be paid-that is left to bargaining.
Judicial intervention, in the form of injunction, has been of notoriously little
effect. In insurance and landlord-tenant law, matters have been legislatively
removed from private agreement because of the inequality of bargaining
power, but the actual operation of the insurance industry and the rental hous-
ing market still depend upon competition among buyers and sellers to supply
the motive force. Sales law under the Uniform Commercial Code, as under the
old Uniform Sales Act, still operates basically as a facility; the parties may
dispense with it by specifying that it will not apply, or avail themselves of
it by allowing it to apply through implication."' It is there to use, or not
use, as the parties wish. In many ways, Article Two acts as a convenient
dictionary for defining terms left undefined by the parties. 92 The main point
here is that the specialized branches of law created by legislation-where
contract has been "robbed" of its subject matter-all contain large areas
which are left to private ordering and which are governed by general contract
law. Moreover, it is only through the making of private agreements in the
unregulated part of these industries that the industries go forward. Without
voluntary agreements the "law" of these industries would have no purpose
and would make no sense unless the industries were operated as public utili-
ties or direct governmental services.93 Until they are, the basic problems cre-
ated by the regime of private ordering will continue to dominate legislation.
Contract issues, such as what conduct is necessary for the formation of an
agreement, what evidence is reliable in showing an agreement, what meaning
should be given to the terms, how much of a deficiency in one party's per-
formance is necessary to excuse the other's and what remedies should be
available, will all have to be taken into account. Professor Macaulay has
noted, for example, that in drafting the recent legislation to regulate fran-
91. See, e.g., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 1-102, 2-719; UNIFORM SALES ACT
§ 71.
92. For some interesting views on the UCC and the death of contract, see Speidel,
Some Reflections Upon Commercial Context and the Judicial Process, 1967 Wis. L.
REV. 822.
93. See Macneil, Whither Contracts, 21 J. LEGAL ED. 403, 408 (1969), for the view
that there are many common elements in all the types of contractual transactions treated
as separate subjects in law school, and that unless the common elements are studied to-
gether we will "lose some of our understanding of the functions and techniques of con-
tracting and of contract law in the various transaction-type areas themselves."
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chises between automobile dealers and manufacturers, these basic contract
issues were paramount.9 4  Here, as in labor legislation, the drafters limited
the freedom of the parties, but in a way designed to force them to have some
kind of contract. It is difficult to see in this any decline in the usefulness
of contract as a social institution.
C. Abstraction as Strength
A second weakness in the "graveyard theory" is its failure to recognize the
strength in contract law's abstractness. As Hurst observed in his study of the
Wisconsin lumber industry, general contract principles furnished the legal
means for getting the industry underway. Before it developed, some ready-
made rules were necessary to enable the industry to grow to a point where
particularized treatment was possible. Because of its flexibility, general con-
tract law was available from the start. Thus, we have an instance where
contract's abstractness was precisely the quality which made it useful. Does
the abstractness and hence the flexibility of general contract law still serve
as a device for regulating new economic relationships? At least one example
comes to mind-the recent decisions implying warranties in residential leases.
Until a few years ago, the relations of landlord and tenant were governed
-by the property concept of the lease as the conveyance of an interest in
land. In rural society, the principal value of a lease had been in the land,
so the landlord was under no obligation to repair any defects in the dwell-
ing.95  As conditions changed, and most tenants became city dwellers, it was
necessary to adjust the common law to the needs of urban life. This was
finally recognized in Javins v. First National Realty Corp.,96 the leading case
for the proposition that residential leases should be considered as contracts
rather than conveyances. The J'avins court stated the problem as follows:
The city dweller who seeks to lease an apartment on the third floor
94. "The questions of what is a failure to perform a contract duty, whether a failure
is a material one, and whether there are any excuses bear a striking resemblance to the
problems dealt with by traditional contract law." Macaulay, supra note 43, at 849. "In
this sense, contract law itself may have lost much of its subject matter, but many of
its ideas continue to be significant in what may be called the 'newly developing nations'
of the law." id. at 850.
95. Paradine v. Jane, Aleyn 26, 82 Eng. Rep. 897 (K.B. 1647), is the classic case-
the tenant must pay rent even though ousted from the premises by an invading army.
96. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970). There has been a parallel development in the
law governing the sale of newly constructed homes. Courts have held that the builder
and seller impliedly warrant that the structure is designed and constructed in a work-
manlike manner. See, e.g., Pollard v. Saxe & Yolles Dev. Co., 525 P.2d 88, 115 Cal.
Rptr. 648 (1974) (en banc); House v. Thornton, 76 Wash. 2d 428, 457 P.2d 199




of a tenement has little interest in the land 30 or 40 feet below,
or even in the bare right to possession within the four walls of his
apartment. When American city dwellers, both rich and poor,
seek "shelter" today, they seek a well known package of goods and
services---a package which includes not merely walls and ceilings,
but also adequate heat, light and ventilation, serviceable plumbing
facilities, secure windows land doors, proper sanitation, and proper
maintenance.9 7
Thus, in Javins, the law is confronted with a problem of finding a useful
body of rules for regulating the relations between landlords and tenants under
new conditions which make the older legal framework obsolete. The possible
solutions include legislation, contract law, or some form of strict liability re-
sembling tort. If contract is dead, one would expect the ultimate solution
to be either in legislation through a housing code or in something akin to the
tort liability for harmful products. At the time Javins was decided, however,
the District of Columbia already had ,a housing code. It is well known, of
course, that housing codes are frequently ignored. Inspectors do not always
inspect, reported violations do not always frighten the violator, and means
exist to discourage complaints. Although the codes have helped a great
deal, the government still is unable to legislate good housing through hous-
ing codes, principally because codes do not supply money for construction
or renovation,98 and because governmental enforcement is not a sufficiently
grave economic threat. If the rent still comes in, one simply balances the
danger of fines against the cost of repair. Judging from the number of vio-
lations outstanding, -the scale of private decision is not weighted heavily in
favor of compliance.
The device of private enforcement through contract law appears to be
more powerful. If the rent stops, operations must stop. This approach also
accords with the modem attitude toward performance of agreements--one
expects to 'be excused from one's own duty if the other party does not fulfill
his. What moral obligation is there to pay rent for premises which are not
as promised? Thus, it would seem both more effective and more in keeping
with current notions of fairness -to allow -tenants to withhold rent if premises
are not up to standards. Why is it necessary, though, to arrive at this result
through contract law? Could not the housing code simply be amended to au-
thorize non-payment of rent-or payment of rent into court-as an additional
means of code enforcement? Why worry about whether -the mutual promises
are "dependent" or "independent" or whether there is an "implied warranty?"
97. 428 F.2d at 1074.
98. See generally Comment, Housing Market Operations and the Pennsylvania Rent
Withholding Act-An Economic Analysis, 17 VILL. L. REv. 886 (1972).
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The answer is that the bundle of rights and duties which comprise a modem
residential lease cannot be dealt with by so simple a means as amendments
to a code. Too many subsidiary issues exist. May the tenant stop paying
completely if there is any code violation, even the most minimal? How
much may he deduct, if anything, for one burned out bulb in a hallway?
Does he have any obligation to pay for the value he has admittedly received
from 'the premises even though they are not as required by the code or as
promised by the landlord? What are his obligations to mitigate damages?
In order to answer these questions, one must resort to the rules of general
contract law, rules designed to solve the typical problems which arise in con-
sensual transactions. Doctrines such as materiality of breach, rescission and
the contractual measure of damages are waiting ready-made to be applied,
and they are being applied.
In Javins itself, the landlord sued for possession after the tenant had
stopped the rent because of code violations. For property law this poses a
difficult problem. We have the theory of constructive eviction, but it re-
quires that the tenant vacate in order to make legal use of the landlord's
breach. If 'the tenant stays he must pay full rent and absent an express cove-
nant cannot recover damages since there is no implied duty to repair. 99 If
the tenant has decided to leave, of course, this property remedy is adequate
and has the virtue of insuring that the landlord will be paid for whatever
value the premises actually have to the tenant. The glaring weakness is that
in the current housing shortage, vacating is not a suitable remedy. Property
law provides no theory by which the tenant can enforce the contract by
staying put and demanding damages, rather than rescinding the contract
'by moving out and stopping rent. To enforce the lease, one must base the
remedy upon a promise.
If property law is insufficient, is it still possible to solve the problem simply
by amending the housing code? Could residential tenants 'be authorized to
halt rent whenever a code violation occurs? Some states have enacted stat-
utes which allow tenants to make repairs and deduct the cost from rent, after
first giving the landlord an opportunity to make the repairs himself.' 00
Upon a moment's reflection, we see that these statutes really amount to
an enactment of basic contract principles and not a blanket authorization to
99. Compare East Haven Associates v. Gurian, 64 Misc. 2d 276, 313 N.Y.S.2d 927
(Civ. Ct. Rec. 1970) with Barash v. Pennsylvania Rental Estate Corp., 26 N.Y.2d 77,
256 N.E.2d 707, 308 N.Y.S.2d 649 (1970). The problem here is "partial constructive
eviction" but the same rules appear to apply. For another example where property con-
cepts dominate remedies, see Diamond Housing Corp. v. Robinson, 257 A.2d 492 (D.C.
Ct. App. 1969).




withhold rent. Both the California and Oregon statutes require the tenant
to make the repairs. This translates into 'a common contracts rule: in agree-
ments to furnish services -where -the performance is faulty or incomplete, the
measure of damages equals the cost of completion. The tenant is not au-
thorized to stop the entire rent, because to do so would be unfair to the land-
lord whenever the rent exceeds the cost of repair. Or, in contract parlance,
the value of the 'breaching party's partial performance would be forfeited-
a result not thought to be enlightened. This statute could only have been
drafted with contract "rules" in mind, and can only be evaluated in light of
the general contract principle that in cases of breach the damages should be
apportioned as nearly 'as possible to fault. When the tenant is also in breach,
and the seriousness of the parties' breaches must be measured one against
the other, it becomes even more obvious how necessary these general contract
principles are in the interpretation and application of the legislation to spe-
cific cases.
Is there a tort solution? A study in point is Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts
Avenue Apartment Corp.101 The tenant in that case was assaulted and
robbed in a common hallway of her apartment house by an intruder. She
proved that the security measures in effect when she moved in-a doorman,
an observation desk in the lobby, attendants stationed at the entrances to a
parking garage connected to the building and locked doors after 9:00 p.m.-
had in every respect been discontinued at the time of the assault. She also
proved that the landlord knew of 'the change in conditions. The court held
that "there is a duty of protection owed 'by the landlord to the tenant in an
urban multiple unit apartment dwelling,' 10 2 and that "there is implied in the
contract between landlord and tenant an obligation on the landlord to provide
those protective measures which are within his reasonable capacity."' 0 3
Thus, a tort duty arose "from 'the logic of 'the situation itself,"1 0 4 and a con-
tract duty arose from an interpretation of the agreement. Could the problem
be solved through a tort duty alone? To do so, it would be necessary, of
course, to define a single standard of care applicable to all landlords. But
what standard should it be? For example, are doormen to be required in
all apartment buildings?' 0 5 The Kline court held that the standard was "rea-
101. 439 F.2d 477 (DC. Cir. 1970).
102. Id. at 483.
103. Id. at 485.
104. Id. at 483.
105. It has been estimated that to provide doormen around the clock in a twenty-
five unit, low-income building in New York C'ty would, if the cost were passed on to
the tenant, increase the per-unit rental by more than 50%. See Comment, The Land-
lord's Emerging Responsibility For Tenant Security, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 275, 298
(1971).
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sonable care in all the circumstances."' 0 It added that "[i]t may be impos-
sible to describe the standard in detail for all situations . . . and evidence
of custom amongst landlords of the same class of 'building may play a signifi-
cant role in determining if the standard has been met.' u0 7  One may well
ask what the "class" of the 'building has to do with tort liability. Does tort
law give more protection to residents of luxury high-rises than it does to resi-
dents of low and middle-income walk-ups? In order to decide the case, the
Kline court (its shoulders to the wall) proclaimed that "the applicable stand-
ard of care in providing protection for the tenant is that standard which this
landlord 'himself was employing . . . when the appellant became a resident
. . . . The tenant was led to expect -that she could rely on this degree of
protection.' 08 'If ,the landlord's duty depends 'upon the "class" of the build-
ing and the conditions promised as an exchange for rent at the time
of contracting, it would seem that whatever tort duty there might be has
been absorbed into the contract duty defined by the lease. Of course, this
is not really so. It only appears to be so because of -the absurd premise upon
which such a statement is based. The premise is that the law of property,
of torts and the device of social control through legislation (landlord-tenant
law) are somehow antagonistically vying here with contract for predomi-
-nance. Nothing could be more wrong.' 0 9
The simple fact is that general contract law contains principles which are
essential for working out disputes in residential leases. First, how can it be
decided whether 'the tenant has any duty at all to pay for premises which
violate 'the housing code? Not by reading the code itself, for it typically con-
tains no indication whether it is intended to become part of a lease. Indeed
the fact 'that the code provides governmentally enforced sanctions is an argu-
ment that private remedies were not intended to be affected." 0 If, however,
one resorts to the principles of general contract law, one finds that the land-
lord's minor or immaterial breach does not excuse the other party's per-
formance; it merely gives a claim for damages. Courts confronted with this
problem have typically made this interpretation."' In Javins, for example,
106. 439 F.2d at 485.
107. Id. at 486.
108. Id.
109. For example, in slum housing the tort standard of care might in theory be more
stringent than the de minimis level that might fairly be implied from the lease itself.
However, in luxury housing the contract standard of safety bargained for in the lease
will frequently be higher than the minimal tort standard. In short, contract and tort
do not compete with one another in supplying the standard of safety for urban apart-
ment dwellers but, instead, are complementary; which standard is applied depends upon
the context.
110. See Posnanski v. Hood, 46 Wis. 2d 172, 174 N.W.2d 528 (1970).
111. In Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970), the court limited the
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the court said that "the jury should be instructed that one or two minor vio-
lations standing alone which do not affect habitability are de minimis and
would not entitle the tenant to a reduction in rent."', 12 This result is inevi-
table under contract principles because to hold otherwise would forfeit the
benefit of the landlord's bargain in circumstances where the defect in his own
performance was very slight. On the other hand, where the landlord's breach
is so material as to deprive the tenant of the substantial benefit of the prem-
ises (making them uninhabitable), then it is unjust to ask the tenant to con-
tinue his performance by paying rent because the tenant would then forfeit
the value of his bargain. In contracts, one result is -implied in the other.
Thus, the meaning of a housing code for private leases can be evaluated in
a reasonable way by using the pre-existing principles of general contract law.
The newly declared right of the tenant to enforce the contract (by retaining
possession and deducting damages from the rent) is no surprise if one remem-
bers the clear parallel and precedent in the law of sales, another contractual
subject. The buyer who receives non-conforming goods is not forced to
choose between the alternatives of rejecting the goods completely or paying
the contract price. He may accept them and deduct the damages for breach
of warranty from the price still due.118 Starting from here, it is not a giant
step to the conclusion that the tenant should be able to accept a non-conform-
ing apartment and deduct damages for breach of warranty of habitability
from the rent still due.
Other problems remain, of course. What if the landlord alleges that the
code violations are the fault of the tenant? The answer in contract is that
the tenant is liable for them under the general principle that damages are
apportioned to fault. Or, in the words of the Jravins court, "the contract prin-
ciple that no one may benefit from his own wrong will allow the landlord
to defend by proving the damage was caused by the tenant's wrongful ac-
tion." 4  This same rationale may be expected to resolve questions about
tenant's right to withhold rent for breach of implied warranty to "vital facilities neces-
sary to maintain the premises in a liveable condition." Id. at 146, 265 A.2d at 535.
In the case where the tenant has vacated the premises at the time of the suit, the prob-
lem should be somewhat different because there is no question of suspending the tenant's
performance. The courts still speak in terms of "habitability," however. See Jack
Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 11. 2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972); Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d
791 (Iowa 1972); Kline v. Bums, 111 N.H. 87, 276 A.2d 248 (1971); Reste Realty
Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444, 251 A.2d 268 (1969); Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426,
462 P.2d 470 (1969). See also Hinson v. Delis, 26 Cal. App. 3d 62, 102 Cal. Rptr.
661 (Ct. App. 1972), where the tenant sued to enjoin the landlord from filing an evic-
tion action.
112. 428 F.2d at 1082 n.63.
113. See UNIFoRM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-714, 717.
114, 428 F.2d at 1082 n.62.
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the tenant's duty to mitigate damages. Granting, however, that the tenant
may deduct something, how much may he deduct? The Javins court said
that nothing may be deducted for "one or two minor violations." That is
to say, in contract terms, that the performance of the innocent party is not
suspended by a minor breach. For the more serious defects which affect
habitability, Javins said that the amount to be deducted is left to the jury.
The exact measure has been defined in other cases to be the difference be-
tween the contract price and the actual value during the tenancy. 115 Under
Javins, the jury will assign a dollar value to the landlord's breach and suspend
the tenant's performance to that extent-an eminently contractual solution.
If the jury finds that only part of the duty to pay is suspended, and the tenant
does not pay the balance, "a judgment for possession may issue forthwith,"" 16
or, in contract terms, the tenant will not be allowed to enforce the contract
without paying for what he has received under it. One may object that the
materiality of a given breach is difficult to measure, and so tenants may find
it risky to withhold rent in doubtful cases. The first answer is that any solu-
tion which genuinely tries to apportion fault equitably here must evaluate the
impact of each party's breach upon the other. The second answer is that
the difficulty of deciding doubtful cases under a proposed rule should never
prevent its use in cases where it clearly applies to produce a better result.
The last problem for contracts which Javins suggests (but does not discuss)
is the effect of an express disclaimer upon the implied warranty of habita-
bili-ty. If this is a contractual matter, can i-t be bargained away? Here the
law must decide whether it is socially useful to make this particular item the
subject of private agreement. Given the present housing market and the im-
portance of minimum standards of habitability, it is unrealistic to expect that
free bargaining will produce acceptable results. Housing codes, in fact, ex-
press a clear legislative judgment to the contrary. Is contract then defeated
as a force here? The answer is "no." One could say, of course, that contract
includes the doctrine that agreements contrary to public policy are void,
and also includes the doctrine of unconscionability. Obviously, these are
adequate to solve the problem in terms of doctrine. 117 However, the real
answer is that general contract law is not defeated or made smaller in signifi-
115. See, e.g., Hinson v. Delis, 26 Cal. App. 3d 62, 102 Cal. Rptr. 661 (Ct. App.
1972); Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791 (Iowa 1972); Kline v. Burns, 111 N.H. 87, 276
A.2d 248 (1971).
116. 428 F.2d at 1083.
117. The parallel with the UCC is clear-limitation of consequential damages is per-
mitted where losses are simply commercial, but not where there is an injury to the per-
son. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 719. And an uninhabitable apartment is surely
more analogous to personal injury than to commercial loss,
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cance (because it alone cannot solve all the legal problems posed by residential
leases. To believe that it is would be to misunderstand the legal process.
D. A Melding of Social Control Devices
It is fundamentally wrong to see any antagonism, competition or conflict be-
tween the law of contracts and that of torts, property or the legislation found
in housing codes. On the contrary, the ultimate success of -the total legal
regime applicable to rental housing will depend on how well these various
legal tools can be made to work together. The legal process depends basi-
cally for its movement upon all of the various cbntributions for which each of
its constituent parts is uniquely fitted-and best fitted-to make. A mo-
ment's reflection will show that this is so. Those who draft codes have the
responsibility for defining as precisely as possible beforehand the particular
minimum standards necessary to protect life and health in rental premises.
Because -they have the means for gathering information describing a wide
range of activity, they can make broad decisions governing an entire industry
with at least some confidence in the probable results of those decisions. They
cannot, however, decide in advance how -to treat each question of private
remedy which may arise from a specific dispute. That is a job for general
common law principles, including -those in the law of contracts. Nor can the
drafters of these codes hope to resolve 'beforehand all the questions arising
in -the more numerous lease transactions in which the "minimums" required
by the code have been far exceeded-whether, for example, the landlord has
provided the specific degree of comfort and security bargained for, or whether
the tenant should be found to have acted in some way contrary to that ex-
pected for the "class" of building in which 'he finds himself. Such questions
are left to private agreement. Insofar as tort duties are concerned, they are
necessarily limited to a standard of general applicability which, again, is con-
cerned with a certain minimum which everyone can be expected to meet.
One cannot possibly take into account under a single standard all the differ-
ent expectations generated by the variety of accommodations now available.
If one tries, the standard becomes so broad as to be 'meaningless. This does
not signify, however, that housing codes and tort laws are "dead" as instru-
ments for legal control of leases. They, just as contract, have their proper
function and are able to handle some questions better -than contract. It
should not be necessary, for example, to allege an implied warranty in or-
der to recover for an obvious act of negligence by a landlord, especially since
the measure of damages and numerous other factors would be different in
tort than in contract. The realistic approach is to see that each legal tool
is able to handle some aspect of this single complex problem better than the
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others. The true objective of the law should be to use each of these tools
so that it strengthens and complements the work of the others.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is principally the failure to see contract as only one among several avail-
able devices that leads Professor Gilmore and the "graveyard theorists" to
believe that contract is somehow "dead." Does the fact that tort law and
legislation are better suited than contract to accomplish some things prove
anything at all when we remember that contract can accomplish still other
things far better than tort or legislation? It is a naive view that cannot see
in our legal system-as in our economy-a considerable division of labor.
One does not compare aspirin to iodine, or ether to penicillin.
Our economic and legal system uses a mixed regime of public and private
ordering to define and achieve its goals.11 To benefit from the variety
and ingenuity of private initiative there must be enough flexibility to allow
new economic relationships to 'be invented and get underway and to modify
the legal treatment of older relationships in light of shifts in the conditions
under which they exist. General contract law often provides this flexibility
better than legislation. It does not follow, however, that legislation is any
less necessary or useful, since it must provide whatever public regulation
there will be, together with the money and machinery to carry it out. The
fact that legislation does and should exist means nothing more than that con-
tract, like all other means of social control, is limited in scope. One of the
greatest objects of public policy is to mark out the boundaries of private ini-
tiative-to encourage it where it is beneficial and discourage it where it is
not. It follows that both contract law and the legislation which limits it are
devoted to the same basic purposes-to channel agreements into useful direc-
tions and encourage people to carry them out. This is so because no sanc-
tion, whether legislative or judicial, can ever supply the benefits of perform-
ance.
118. See generally H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN
THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAw (tent. ed. 1958).
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